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The Committee for Economic Development is anindependent research and policy organization ofsome 200 business leaders and educators. CED
is non-profit, non-partisan, and non-political. Its pur-
pose is to propose policies that bring about steady
economic growth at high employment and reasonably
stable prices, increased productivity and living 
standards, greater and more equal opportunity for every
citizen, and an improved quality of life for all. 
All CED policy recommendations must have the
approval of trustees on the Research and Policy
Committee. This committee is directed under the
bylaws, which emphasize that “all research is to be
thoroughly objective in character, and the approach 
in each instance is to be from the standpoint of the 
general welfare and not from that of any special 
political or economic group.” The committee is aided
by a Research Advisory Board of leading social 
scientists and by a small permanent professional staff. 
The Research and Policy Committee does not attempt
to pass judgment on any pending specific legislative
proposals; its purpose is to urge careful consideration of
the objectives set forth in this statement and of the best
means of accomplishing those objectives.  
Each statement is preceded by extensive discussions,
meetings, and exchange of memoranda. The research is
undertaken by a subcommittee, assisted by advisors
chosen for their competence in the field under study. 
The full Research and Policy Committee participates in
the drafting of recommendations. Likewise, the trustees
on the drafting subcommittee vote to approve or disap-
prove a policy statement, and they share with the
Research and Policy Committee the privilege of submit-
ting individual comments for publication.
The recommendations presented herein are those of the
trustee members of the Research and Policy Committee and
the responsible subcommittee. They are not necessarily
endorsed by other trustees or by non-trustee subcommittee
members, advisors, contributors, staff members, or others
associated with CED.
RESPONSIBILITY FOR CED STATEMENTS ON NATIONAL POLICY
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PURPOSE OF THIS STATEMENT
The Committee for Economic Development (CED)
stated two years ago that “America now stands at a fis-
cal crossroad.” Developments since have made the
nation’s choices only more pressing.
In 2003, in Exploding Deficits, Declining Growth: The
Federal Budget and the Aging of America, we foresaw a
decade of significant budget deficits, with concern that
enactment of a Medicare prescription drug benefit and
the cost of a global war on terrorism could make those
deficits even larger. Now, those contingencies have
materialized, and the deficit outlook, in an apples-to-
apples comparison, has worsened accordingly—and
more besides. Further contingencies, including a con-
tinued intense war effort, extension of tax cuts and
new tax relief, sustained increases in the price of oil
and possible continuing weak tax revenues, cloud the
outlook. A significant drop in the value of the U.S.
dollar relative to free-floating foreign currencies signals
possible concern in world financial markets.
Furthermore, though our 2003 statement expressed a
less-serious concern about near-term than long-term
budget deficits, the long run has grown ever closer.
The retirement of the first of the baby-boom genera-
tion, on early Social Security benefits, will begin in
2008—just three years from now. The current budget
outlook shows no signs of relief before then. Thus, the
time that the nation has to right the budget before the
inevitable adverse demographic forces bear full force is
disturbingly short.
And finally, the pending economic policy agenda
includes numerous issues, such as Social Security
reform and the extension of expiring tax cuts, which
would affect the budget outlook significantly. It is clear
that these issues must be considered with full regard
for the nation’s fiscal standing.
Accordingly, CED believes that it is important to reiter-
ate its concern about the size of the federal budget
deficit, to restate its principles for the nation’s fiscal
policy, and to evaluate the policy choices that confront
the federal government at this crucial time.
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The latest federal budget projections indicatethat deficits in the near term are worsening,not improving, while the retirement of the
baby-boom generation with its adverse long-range
budget pressures is just a few years away. Under cur-
rent policies, there will be inadequate time to right the
budget before the rapid aging of the population could
take control out of policymakers’ hands.
At the beginning of 2001, budget watchers anticipated
substantial and growing surpluses, large enough to end
reliance on the vanishing surpluses in the Social Security
and Medicare Trust Funds (see chart 1). Since that time,
mostly as a result of policy action (but with significant
economic and technical estimating changes as well), the
outlook has deteriorated by more than a cumulative $10
trillion over fiscal years 2002 through 2011.
Much of this change in the outlook is due to policies
already enacted, on both the tax and the spending
sides of the ledger. Some is due to reasonable anticipa-
tions of future policy decisions, including extensions
of expiring tax cuts, response to the rapid extension of
the reach of the individual alternative minimum tax
(AMT), and expected continued future increases in
annual appropriations; such judgments about future
policy actions are, of course, inherently uncertain.1
But with the most reasonable assumptions, including
that the major expiring tax cuts are made permanent
(as the Administration’s budget proposes), that the
AMT is cut back, and that the war effort begins to
phase down in less than two years, the budget outlook
continues to deteriorate (although by a small margin
this year), even though the economy continues to
CHART 1 CBO Budget Projections
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recover and expand. There are at least two important
dimensions to this deterioration.
For one thing, current projections of the deficit for
each and every future year are worse now than they
were one year ago (that is, the line for the January
2005 budget baseline is everywhere below the line for
January 2004 in chart 1). Thus, even though the econ-
omy continues to expand, the budget outlook still has
not moved in a favorable direction. This troubling lack
of improvement, even in a growing economy, casts
serious doubt on optimistic statements that we can
“grow our way out of the deficit”—that the budget
will improve if the economy continues to grow, or that
“supply-side” effects of tax cuts will increase produc-
tivity growth.
The second troubling aspect of the budget outlook is
that the newly projected figures no longer anticipate
significant improvement in the later years. The deficit
for fiscal year 2005 is expected to be just short of
$400 billion, and possibly to exceed the 2004 largest-
ever deficit of $412 billion. Over the next ten years,
the deficit never falls below $324 billion (in 2010)
before rising again. And by the most significant meas-
ure for the long run, the nation’s accumulated debt
grows as a percentage of the GDP in every year.
Some budget watchers have taken comfort in the fact
that the deficits in recent years have not exceeded the
very highest past level as a percentage of the GDP (6.0
percent, in 1983). What this optimistic view misses is
that the true bottom line, the accumulated debt held
by the public, is growing faster than the nation’s
capacity to repay it (that is, the GDP). This means that
the deficit is too high, even if it may not be the high-
est ever. And with the debt growing faster than the
nation’s income until and beyond the full force of the
retirement of the baby boom—with the first baby
boomers collecting early Social Security benefits in
2008, and becoming eligible for Medicare coverage in
2011, and full Social Security benefits in 2012—we
have no current prospect of forestalling a destabilizing
and self-perpetuating expansion of the debt burden. 
CED and other observers have in the recent past
expressed much less concern about near-term deficits
than those projected for the long run. The sad truth
today is that the short-term deficits now extend all the
way to the long run—in other words, the deficits have
become structural, and will continue even if the econ-
omy continues to grow healthily, all the way to and
through the onset of the retirement of the baby-boom
generation. Clearly, policy must change significantly,
and the sooner, the better. 
The deterioration in the budget outlook can be
defended, in part and in the short run, because some
of the increases in expenditures arguably were neces-
sary. Some would contend that the nation’s core
defense program was in need of expansion in 2001;
many would support the later spending to repair the
damage from the subsequent terrorist attacks, and to
improve homeland security. However, the fact that
expenditures are necessary does not render them free,
or devoid of fiscal consequences. Even fully justified
drivers of past deficits must be paid for if they extend
into the future. In the long run, such costs erode the
nation’s savings just like any other, as the following
section will explain.
Deficits Matter
Evidence continues to mount that such sustainedlarge budget deficits will erode U.S. investment,productivity growth, and prosperity for years
and even decades to come. In addition, one cannot
discount the risk that deficits could seriously threaten
economic stability, and force abrupt and painful policy
corrections. As CED Trustee Peter G. Peterson has
pointed out, if the fiscal imbalance is not corrected,
ultimately “the government will face stark options:
either draconian cuts in defense, education, transporta-
tion, the criminal justice and other programs, or huge
tax hikes—or, of course, both.”2 These risks are at the
heart of CED’s concern about the budget.
While there is not unanimity among economists, there
are some important principles on which most econo-
mists, and CED, agree.
Reduced productivity growth, reduced future incomes.
First, we know that the key to long-term economic
growth and rising living standards is increasing pro-
ductivity—that is, the nation’s ability to produce more
goods and services with the resources at its disposal.
The economy grows when new ideas are developed,
when they are reflected in a more productive capital
stock and labor force, and when the economy is flexible
and adaptive enough to respond to new opportunities. 
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Second, we know that federal budget deficits interfere
with this process, primarily by siphoning off funds from
private investment (see chart 2), and that deficits may
reduce public investment as well. Deficits usurp the
national saving (household saving, business profits, and
government surpluses) otherwise available for invest-
ment; just as the nation’s saving is diminished when
households borrow to spend more than their income,
that saving is also diminished when the government
spends more than its revenues. When the government
borrows by selling government debt to finance the
resulting deficit, it uses the saving otherwise available
for private investment at home or abroad.*
By reducing private investment at home, higher
deficits leave the nation with a smaller capital stock,
giving its workforce fewer and less-effective tools with
which to work—whether computers and software,
machines, transportation equipment, or buildings and
other structures. This slows the growth in the produc-
tivity of workers, which, in turn, leads to slower
growth in living standards. The “crowding out” of
domestic investment by federal deficits is not just an
abstraction suggested by economic analysis; it has
been an historical fact, particularly during the large
changes in the deficit during the 1980s and 1990s.
(See Exploding Deficits, Declining Growth, pp 6-8.) 
Higher interest rates... This linkage between budget
deficits and investment usually arises because govern-
ment borrowing bids interest rates higher than they
otherwise would be, thereby discouraging private
investment. The current low level of interest rates,
however, has raised an issue that has figured promi-
nently in the deficit debate: Do larger deficits really
raise interest rates? Elementary economic reasoning
* The U.S. National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) include public expenditures on physical capital, such as
structures, equipment, and software, in national saving and investment. Other public expenditures that raise future
output and income, such as those on research and development, education, and training are not included in saving and
investment and therefore add to the computed budget deficit. A comprehensive capital budget would include such
expenditures in saving and investment, but the problems in defining genuine investment expenditures are acute.
CHART 2 Federal Deficits Crowd Out Private Investment
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strongly supports such a relationship, and Federal
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has reaffirmed this
view.3 Numerous econometric studies differ on the
strength of this relationship. A recent review of these
studies, however, finds that, if expectations about
future deficits are taken into account, a sustained
increase in annual budget deficits of one percent of
GDP can be expected to raise long-term interest rates
by about 50 basis points (that is, one-half percentage
point) after one year. We believe these findings sup-
port the common-sense view that deficits, because
they increase the demand for credit, raise the price of
credit, which is the rate of interest. This in turn
reduces domestic investment and impairs long-term
economic growth.
...or increased foreign debt. Moreover, focusing on the
relationship between deficits and interest rates
obscures a more fundamental point. As globalization
proceeds and capital markets become more integrated,
the impact of deficits on domestic interest rates and
investment may be muted—but the adverse effects on
the nation’s future prosperity remain just as great. 
Twenty years ago, economists were surprised to dis-
cover that the large deficits of the 1980s triggered
much more borrowing from abroad and smaller
reductions in domestic investment than anticipated.
Deficits financed by borrowing from abroad may not
have large effects on interest rates, because foreign
funds relieve the shortage of domestic saving.
But this foreign borrowing leaves the nation increas-
ingly mortgaged and reduces its future income even if
interest rates do not change. If our nation finances its
own large budget deficits, the United States can afford
fewer foreign assets, whether auto plants in Brazil or
stocks issued by enterprises in emerging markets. But
even if foreign investors buy the U.S. debt, they
acquire claims against the United States. In both cases,
the U.S. net international investment position deterio-
rates—we own fewer assets abroad, and foreigners
own more of our assets. Thus, the nation’s wealth
becomes smaller, and incomes of Americans in the
future will be correspondingly reduced—either
because the total income we earn on our foreign assets
will be smaller, or because we must pay more debt
service to foreigners. In fact, the net international
investment position of the United States has deterio-
rated from a surplus in the 1980s to a $2.6 trillion
deficit at the end of 2003, with more than $2.0 trillion
of that deterioration occurring in the last seven years.
This is a different kind of “crowding out,” but one that
reduces the nation’s net wealth today and our incomes
tomorrow just as surely as reductions in domestic
investment do. And these future income reductions are
not just financial losses. When we borrow from abroad,
we borrow not only financial capital but real goods and
services, reflected in larger trade deficits. Ultimately,
Americans must “pay back” those goods and services
(with interest), either as increased exports or diminished
imports, which leaves less for domestic consumption to
maintain living standards tomorrow.
Domestic and foreign “crowding out,” therefore, are
simply two paths to the same end—a reduction of liv-
ing standards tomorrow to pay for today’s federal
deficits and consumption. Thus, deficits do matter,
even if we live in a globalized economy that substi-
tutes foreign borrowing for higher interest rates.
The relationship between deficits, saving, and private
investment is not the only way that deficits affect
long-term growth and the future standard of living.
Two other dangers bear mentioning—the effects of
deficits on productive public investments* and on
economic stability.
Crowding out public investment. CED has consis-
tently advocated productivity-enhancing public
investments such as basic scientific research, improved
public schools, and expanded access to quality pre-
school education.4 These public investments are a
* While lower national saving must reduce national investment, not all economists agree that larger deficits reduce
national saving. A minority argues that if deficits rise, households will increase their saving by a corresponding
amount to provide for future tax increases, to be imposed on either them or their descendants. This is an interest-
ing theory, but there is little empirical evidence that households make significant adjustments of this kind. The U.S.
household saving rate has been falling more or less continuously since the early 1980s, during periods of both ris-
ing and falling deficits. Moreover, this view requires households to have extraordinary foresight; if government and
private forecasters have been so continually surprised by rapidly changing deficit forecasts, how are we to assume
that the average household can do better? See B. Douglas Bernheim, Ricardian Equivalence: An Evaluation of Theory
and Evidence, Working Paper No. 2330 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1987).
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needed complement to private investment—basic
research builds a store of knowledge that leads to
future technological advances, workforce skills make
new technologies more productive, and public infra-
structure facilitates private business activity. But when
budget deficits grow, there is a danger that desirable
public investments will be cut back. First, these pro-
grams often lack the broad base of public support for
the three largest items in the budget: national security,
Social Security, and health care. And second, when
deficits escalate, federal interest expenses also grow,
leaving less of the budget available for “discretionary”
uses such as public investment. (See Exploding Deficits,
Declining Growth, p. 7.) The potential budgetary
“crowding out” of these expenditures under the pres-
sure of rising entitlement spending and larger deficits
clearly poses a risk for long-term economic growth.
Potential financial instability. Finally, deficits that
reduce the nation’s net foreign investment and leave a
large stock of foreign claims against the United States
not only reduce future income but also make the
economy (and, indeed, the world economy) poten-
tially less stable. When any country’s obligations to
foreign investors grow large relative to its capacity to
repay, there is an increasing risk that investors will
begin to question the quality of those assets—that is,
their total return, including especially the preservation
of principal (because of possible adverse shifts in cur-
rency values, or increases in interest rates). Such a
shift in market psychology can trigger a “run”—that is,
an attempt by many investors to dump their assets on
the market at the same time. When foreign lenders
start dumping a country’s assets, the results for the
domestic economy can be disastrous, as recent experi-
ence in Asia, Russia, and Argentina testifies.
To be sure, the United States is not Argentina or Russia;
the role of the dollar as the preeminent international
reserve currency has been unique. But the U.S. econ-
omy will not be immune to sudden changes in interest
rates, exchange rates, and asset prices if it comes to
depend on ever-larger financial inflows, especially as the
Euro begins to emerge as a potentially competitive
reserve asset. Indeed, the U.S. reliance on foreign
investment has become so large that a mere slowing of
the flow of foreign purchases of dollar-denominated
assets—not even a full-blown run on the dollar—could
be enough to shake markets significantly. A decision by
OPEC to price its oil in Euros rather than dollars could
shock the markets. The decline in the dollar against the
Euro and the Japanese yen over the last three years
clearly illustrates that this vulnerability is real.
How large the current account deficit and foreign
indebtedness can grow before they are perceived to 
be unsustainable cannot be determined with any 
precision, and will depend on the circumstances of the
time. It is possible that global markets have given us a
period of grace because of unrelated economic weak-
ness in other countries, or because of a presumption
that the United States will right its financial imbal-
ances in due time. But both common sense and historical
evidence suggest that borrowing from abroad cannot be
limitless; at some point, foreign lenders will see escalating
new borrowing as a threat to the value of their assets and
will react, to the detriment of the borrower.
These risks are too great to justify a gamble that we
will grow out of these deficits through tax cuts’ “sup-
ply-side” effects on productive capacity. As noted
earlier, there is as yet no sign of improvement in the
budget after the most recent round of tax cuts.
Economic studies indicate that, while lower marginal
tax rates do increase work and saving incentives for
some individuals, the positive effects of these incen-
tives are relatively modest, and in the long term will
be more than offset by the growth-reducing effects of
the larger deficits they create.5 An earlier CED study
estimated that the rate of productivity growth would
have to be about 50 percent higher just to bring the
budget into balance by the mid-21st century—and
deficits would still be rising for about the next thirty
years. We know of no reputable analysis finding that
tax cuts would raise long-term productivity growth by
anything close to 50 percent; certainly, there are no
hopeful signs to date.
We also caution against a gamble that near-term
deficits will motivate as yet unspecified spending cuts
at some later hour, and thereby rescue the budget. The
last onset of large deficits, in the early 1980s, extended
for almost two decades. At that time, the retirement of
the baby-boom generation was more than two decades
away, allowing some hope that this wager could be
redeemed if proven wrong. Now, with the retirement
of the first of the baby boomers just three years away,
we have no such margin for error.
To summarize, failure to save is not necessarily a har-
binger of economic collapse; but even if we are spared
substantial instability, low saving foreshadows a grad-
ual and steady undermining of our nation’s well being,
more like termites in the woodwork than a wolf at the
door. A society that fails to put aside resources for
tomorrow will not have a higher standard of living
tomorrow. It is a death of a thousand cuts. 
In fact, it is entirely fair to characterize large deficits
today as delayed tax increases on future workers. All of
the ill effects of tax increases, including the direct bur-
dens and the dampening of incentives, will be felt just as
surely as if the step were legislated directly. If the debt is
incurred without offset, the tax increase is inevitable. 
Principles for Budget Policy
The options for fiscal restraint today areextremely unpalatable. If policymakers considerand reject curtailing homeland security expen-
ditures, restricting military spending, reducing future
Social Security benefits, cutting back on Medicare pay-
ments, and curbing Medicaid expenditures, as they
have in recent years, they have already (considering
that net interest costs are impossible to cut directly)
placed off limits more than 70 percent of the budget.
Extending popular expiring tax cuts eliminates further
options, leaving the goal of fiscal sustainability appar-
ently unachievable.
It is therefore hardly surprising that the effective
response to the question “what gives?” is usually “none
of the above.” Similarly, when confronted with such
unpalatable choices and their political implications, the
response to the question of when a major course cor-
rection must be made is: “Later.” But time is rapidly
running out. To start the process and begin to square
this numerical circle, CED believes that it is essential to
establish and adhere to guiding principles.
Since CED laid out its principles for budget policy-
making in 2003, circumstances have changed
somewhat. Most notably, concerns about a substantial
near-term weakening of the economy that would abort
the then-nascent recovery have lifted. However, we
believe that our principles remain valid. And so, as the
nation contemplates quantum changes in fiscal policy
through revisions to Social Security and taxation, we
reiterate our standards for policymaking:
First, any tenable budget program must address the
budget deficit on every front, including both compre-
hensive spending reductions and alternative or
additional revenues. The budget choices we face all
appear to be untenable: cutting Social Security and
Medicare; constraining defense spending; raising taxes.
But that is exactly the point. Current budget deficits
are so large that none of these measures alone will suf-
fice; all must be brought to the table to construct a
workable solution. While reshaping Social Security or
The CED plan for reforming Social Security would preserve the cur-
rent basic system but modify its structure to restore solvency and
increase national saving. In addition, it would give workers the
opportunity to earn higher investment returns by establishing a 
“second tier” of privately owned Personal Retirement Accounts,
which would be financed without additional government borrowing.
The changes in the basic system, to be phased in gradually, would
include:
■ The initial benefit levels of upper- and middle-income workers,
which currently rise with wages, would increase more slowly
(but continue to rise in real terms).
■ The normal retirement age (NRA), currently 65 years, would
gradually increase to 70 over a period of 30 years and be
indexed to life expectancy thereafter. (The NRA is currently
scheduled to rise to 67 between 2003 and 2026.)
■ The early retirement age, currently 62 years, would be increased
to 65 over this 30 year period and subsequently similarly
indexed.
■ The years of covered employment included in the calculation of
initial benefits would be gradually increased from 35 to 40.
■ Benefits from the basic program in excess of contributions made
by the worker would be taxed, with the additional revenues to
be deposited in the Social Security trust funds. 
■ A reduction in benefits for nonworking spouses from one-half
to one-third of the worker’s benefit would be phased-in gradu-
ally to improve equity between working and non-working
spouses. 
■ To make coverage universal, all new state and local government
employees would be required to participate and current employ-
ees could choose to participate. 
CED also proposes the creation of privately owned, personal 
retirement accounts (PRAs): 
■ Both employers and employees would be required to contribute
1.5 percent of payroll to privately owned personal retirement
accounts. (The self-employed would contribute 3 percent.)
These mandatory accounts would receive preferential tax treat-
ment similar to 401(k) plans and would be subject to
appropriate fiduciary regulations, including a requirement that
accumulated funds be preserved for retirement. The Federal
Thrift Savings Plan provides a general model for these accounts.
Source: CED, Fixing Social Security, 1997; CED, New Opportunities
for Older Workers, 1999.
CED’s Proposal 
to Reform Social Security
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Medicare or raising additional taxes is unattractive, the
real choice is between planned and rational policies
now, or more rushed and severe steps down the road.
Second, do no harm. The first step in climbing out of a
hole is to stop digging. We cannot afford economic
policy decisions today that further raise deficits tomor-
row. Tax and spending proposals should be considered
in this longer-term context.
Third, make long-term budgetary balance and 
economic growth explicit policy goals. Without 
long-term fiscal policy goals, budget policy is adrift.
Without an anchor, policy will be driven by the politi-
cal winds. It is essential that current decisions be taken
with full recognition of the harmful consequences that
loom ahead on the current budgetary course. We are
concerned that recent budget proposals would leave
the deficit too high as the retirement of the baby-boom
generation threatens to drive the deficit even higher.
Fourth, give pro-growth policies higher priority. We
must avoid budget cuts that reduce public investments
in favor of today’s consumption. As the budget deficit
grows, a disproportionate burden of fiscal restraint may
fall on education and training programs that build
human capital, research and development activities that
advance knowledge, and infrastructure investments
that support the private sector. In previous reports,
CED has noted the importance of such public invest-
ments for economic growth.
Fifth, distribute the costs of pro-growth policies 
equitably. Who should bear these costs? Programs with
widely shared benefits are preferable to those with ben-
efits tailored narrowly to few recipients. In addition,
the burden of fiscal restraint should not be placed dis-
proportionately on low-income families with little
political voice. As former OMB Director David
Stockman said, in a different era but a similar context,
we should resist weak claims, not weak claimants.6
We will now apply these five principles to some of the
pressing economic policy issues of this year: Social
Security; the annual appropriations process of the
budget; and tax cuts and tax reform. We will also dis-
cuss the biggest player missing from the policy table
this year: health care.
The Fiscal Agenda: Fixing Social Security
By the President’s decision, the first and mostprominent item on the legislative agenda for thisyear is Social Security reform. Social Security is
of vital importance both in its own right, and because it
has substantial impact on the nation’s overall fiscal pol-
icy. CED issued its own report, Fixing Social Security, in
1997, and we believe that the principles and policy rec-
ommendations are as pertinent today as they were then.
We are concerned today that a misguided approach to
Social Security might not only endanger the accom-
plishments of that program, but also miss an important
opportunity to turn the nation’s fiscal policy back to the
right direction—or even do still further damage to our
financial standing at home and in the international mar-
ketplace. In short, Social Security legislation could
make or break the budget. 
Like most Americans, we believe that Social Security is
one of the most successful social programs in U.S. his-
tory. The basic objective of Social Security—to protect
the economic security of retirees—is sound, and the
nation must not falter in its commitment to it. Social
Security also provides an important safety net for sur-
vivors of younger workers, and for the disabled, saving
their families from severe financial distress. It provides
financial security for those who live very long lives,
with inflation protection that is virtually impossible to
obtain from the private sector. The decline in poverty
rates for the elderly is strong evidence of the overall
beneficial effects of this program. Social Security fulfills
all of these functions at minuscule administrative cost.
These virtues must be preserved through any proposed
reform.
Still, because of the challenge posed by the aging of the
U.S. population, substantial change in the Social
Security system is inevitable. When the baby-boom
generation begins to retire, the system’s current operat-
ing surplus will begin to decline, after which the trust
fund balances will be drawn down at a rapid rate. If no
action is taken, the system will be forced to impose a
very large, inequitable and economically inefficient
increase in the tax burden on future workers, and/or a
very sharp and disruptive cut in benefits, at some time
in an approximate range of from 2018 (the time when
Social Security tax revenues fall short of benefits,
according to the Social Security actuary) to 2052
(when the Social Security Trust Fund is exhausted,
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according to the Congressional Budget Office). But the
problems of the system should not be exaggerated;
under current economic and demographic assumptions,
and with no additional sources of revenue, Social
Security can continue to pay somewhere in an esti-
mated range of from about 73 percent (according to the
Social Security actuary) to about 78 percent (according
to the Congressional Budget Office) of currently prom-
ised benefits in perpetuity.
Fortunately, adverse outcomes are avoidable if reforms
are enacted promptly. Because Social Security is so
politically sensitive, political leaders have been loath to
rectify fiscal imbalances in the past until a crisis
appeared imminent. But it is imperative now that pol-
icy makers initiate reforms long before the cupboard
is bare, because the cost of restoring fiscal balance
rises substantially each year that action is post-
poned. In addition, workers must be given advance
notice about any significant changes in the system,
so that they can make appropriate adjustments in
their retirement saving and in their career plans that
affect the number of years they will continue to work.
Consequently, we applaud the President and other poli-
cymakers who seek to address this problem promptly.
Objectives of Social Security: the safety net. At the
same time, CED emphasizes that prompt action should
not be hasty, ill-chosen or incomplete. As we noted
above, Social Security’s achievements should not be put
in jeopardy. If Social Security is to continue to provide a
safety net against very old age and inflation, the current
defined benefit cannot be reduced too much. Similarly,
if accumulations in private accounts are to be annu-
itized to provide a guaranteed life-long income, they
cannot also be bequeathed to the workers’ heirs. There
are other concerns with respect to disability and sur-
vivors insurance, given that workers who pass away or
become disabled will by definition have had less than a
full working life to accumulate balances in private
accounts. These are questions that will require careful
consideration.
Objectives of Social Security: generational equity.
The fiscal imbalance in the Social Security program is
not its only problem. Equally important is the fact that
Social Security, as currently designed, creates serious
inequities between generations. Unlike their parents
and grandparents, who benefited greatly from Social
Security, many of the present generation of young
workers and most of their children will be saddled with
a payroll tax burden that will most assuredly exceed the
benefits they themselves will receive. Not surprisingly,
polls indicate that young people are losing faith in the
Social Security program because they believe that the
government cannot keep its promises to them. They
correctly perceive that the present system will remain
solvent only if benefits are cut, or taxes are raised, and
that either change will reduce the investment return
they receive from contributions to Social Security.
Objectives of Social Security: budget sustainability.
Furthermore, Social Security is a significant underpin-
ning of the nation’s now-crumbling fiscal structure; it
must not be weakened, but rather its reform should
contribute to the strengthening of the government’s
budgetary standing. For at least the next 13 years,
Social Security will be an important source of support
for the otherwise deteriorating remainder of the federal
budget. After that time, Social Security itself will begin
to drag the total budget down. Policies to strengthen
Social Security’s long-run balance could make an
important, and possibly critical, contribution to the
overall budget picture for the next three to four decades,
and could increase the insufficient flow of total savings
for the prosperity of the nation as a whole. On the other
hand, policies that hope to strengthen Social Security in
the still more distant long run, but in fact weaken its
finances for the foreseeable future, could instead portend
fiscal collapse within what would have been the sound
lifetime of the Social Security program itself.
Objectives of Social Security: national saving. Another
essential goal of Social Security reform (upheld in CED’s
proposed program) is to increase national saving. As the
population ages, a rising share of the nation’s real output
must be transferred from workers who produce goods
and services to the non-working retired population.
Although this shift in resources is inevitable, the burden
on future workers can be alleviated by increasing national
saving and investment. Additional saving will stimulate
economic growth and increase the size of the economic
pie that must be shared. Unfortunately, national saving
has fallen dramatically in the United States in recent years
at the very time when demographic conditions call for
more saving (see Exploding Deficits, figure 13, page 14). If
it is to be effective in easing the burden on future work-
ers, Social Security reform—a once-in-a-decade event, 
at the very least—must also make a contribution to 
national saving and economic growth.
In our 1997 policy statement, Fixing Social Security, CED
recommends a cohesive package of reforms that can deal
effectively with both the insolvency and the intergenera-
tional inequity problems while preserving the
fundamental goals of the original system. We believe that
this can be done without reducing benefits to current
retirees, raising payroll tax rates, or placing an unaccept-
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able burden on future generations. (A brief description of
CED’s reforms is presented in the text box on page 6.)
But rather than making a detailed case for particular pro-
grammatic reforms, this report simply urges that we
observe the above-stated broad principles of fiscal
responsibility in any renewal of Social Security.
In particular, if we must do no harm (as our second
principle holds), then we must not worsen the budget
by borrowing still more money today, in the name of
saving Social Security in the far-distant future. The
federal budget is in dire straits already; as noted above,
the public debt already is growing faster than the
nation’s income, and current estimates show that the
deficit outlook has been progressively worsening, year
by year, when comparisons are made on a consistent,
apples-to-apples basis. There are inestimable risks to
allowing it to grow even worse. And because Social
Security and Medicare are running cash-flow surpluses,
the deficits in the rest of the budget are even larger, and
the budget is in even more danger when Social Security
and Medicare turn cash-flow negative in the coming
decades.
Risks: Deficits for decades. This context is important
because some would advocate policies that would be
alleged to make Social Security solvent when measured
over an unrealistically long or even an infinite time
horizon, with substantial net budgetary costs and
increases in debt (to finance the creation of personal
retirement accounts) for several decades offset only in
the far-distant future with hoped-for program savings.
CED finds such an approach extraordinarily risky—
especially when world financial markets already have
begun to question our nation’s ability and will to control
a public debt that already is growing faster than the
economy.
CED advocated personal retirement accounts in its
Social Security reform proposal. However, CED consid-
ered, and rejected, options that would have funded
those accounts through diversion of payroll taxes into
those accounts, with the lost revenues replaced through
increased public debt. Diverting payroll taxes to per-
sonal saving accounts would impose a substantial
burden on young workers during the transition period
because they would be required simultaneously to fund
their own retirements and those of current retirees (and
older workers who would remain under the current
program). It is no favor to those younger workers that
the transition costs are postponed; the resulting deficits
and debt would burden them for the rest of their lives.
The transition costs would continue to mount for
decades, and they would bear interest into the even
more distant future. Consequently, the rise in the federal
debt would be massive. (If one third of OASDI taxes
had been placed in private accounts in 2004, for exam-
ple—the equivalent of about two percentage points of
both employee and employer contributions (four per-
centage points total)—the federal borrowing
requirement for that year alone would have been almost
$250 billion higher.) So although increasing the federal
debt might postpone costs, it certainly would not elimi-
nate the burden of “privatization.” In fact, as was argued
above, it would constitute a delayed tax increase on
future workers.
Risks: accounting gimmicks. There are no accounting
devices that can eliminate the ill effects of mounting debt.
The issue is not what different budget measures are
called. Still, the debate thus far has unduly emphasized
ways to define away the debt that would be created in a
Social Security renewal involving personal accounts.
One suggested accounting approach would be to con-
sider the expenditure of the diverted payroll tax to be
“off-budget,” and to raise the cash that would be neces-
sary to replace the payroll tax revenues by issuing
“recognition bonds,” which would be counted separately
from other publicly held debt. The rationale for such sep-
arate accounting would be that costs of so restructuring
the Social Security program are really investments that
would yield a financially stable system in the future; thus,
those costs should not be considered on the same terms
as other current government expenditures. Another line
of argument for special accounting treatment is that the
federal government already has an “implicit liability” for
the projected future shortfalls in Social Security, and that
costs of addressing that liability are therefore not new
debt; rather, such debt is merely the recognition of an
existing liability.
In its consideration of its Social Security proposal, CED
concluded that the recognition bond approach would not
be an attractive option. At bottom, the issue is very sim-
ple: Debt is debt, whatever it is called; the federal
government must pay interest on all new debt, whatever
the motivation of its underlying costs. Also, debt accu-
mulated over the early decades would limit the federal
government’s flexibility to address any other contingen-
cies that might arise—including, possibly, the need for
up-front funding for a vital health-care reform, or a war
or other national security emergency.
Risks: financial instability. As noted above, some pro-
posals to finance personal retirement accounts with debt
have projected substantial net budget costs for three or
four decades before anticipated net savings materialize.
Advocates have sometimes had to rely on present dis-
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counted evaluations over an infinite time horizon to
show positive net benefits. Such evaluations may
prove far too optimistic to satisfy the financial markets
who are focused on the here-and-now. The budget costs
of financing individual accounts today are near certain.
In contrast, savings from Social Security benefit cuts
promised for four or five decades from now must be
seen as highly speculative.
Reform approaches that rely heavily on returns from
individually managed accounts to make up for substan-
tial cuts in the traditional Social Security defined benefit
will be tested in years when the financial markets are
weak, and new retirees see much reduced retirement
incomes. For example, William Dudley of Goldman
Sachs pointed out hypothetically that a new retiree in
2003 with a personal account 50 percent in stocks
would receive a monthly annuity payment one-third
lower than an otherwise identical new retiree in 2000.7
Would the political system react to such an episode in
the future by providing some relief to the less-advan-
taged retirees—especially if their traditional defined
benefit had been cut significantly, leaving them exposed
to potentially poverty-level incomes? Today’s financial
markets could well question whether the speculative
future savings based on those benefit cuts will in fact
materialize. If the markets’ judgment is negative, the
impact on the economy today could be strongly adverse.
The American Academy of Actuaries has already
expressed its concern that analyses over infinite time
periods “...provide little if any useful information
about the program’s long-range finances and indeed
are likely to mislead anyone lacking technical expert-
ise...”8 Prudence might suggest that infinite-time
analyses might be useful to motivate action to achieve
savings to improve the system, but that savings that are
projected to materialize in the very long run should not
be used to justify spending in the near term.
Similarly, the notion that borrowing to finance the
establishment of personal retirement accounts merely
substitutes explicit debt for an already existing implicit
debt raises the potential of serious disruptions in the
financial markets. On the one hand, a distant implicit
commitment of the federal government is always sub-
ject to change; on the other, actual Treasury securities
are backed by the full faith and credit of the United
States. Thus, explicit debt, on the one hand, and the
concept of implicit debt, on the other, are two very
different things. And in practical terms, actors in
domestic and foreign financial markets might well
consider the implicit commitment to pay future Social
Security benefits well in excess of expected revenues
as the kind of commitment that almost certainly
would be changed. The examples of past reforms of
Social Security (for example, in 1983) that wiped out
then-anticipated future shortfalls could give the mar-
kets reason to expect the currently forecast trust fund
deficits will be eliminated. Instead monetizing those
anticipated deficits, and converting them to sovereign
debt, could be a shock to the financial markets, not a
mere like-kind exchange. 
In short, in CED’s judgment, debt-financed Social
Security restructuring would be a virtually irreversible
decision with potentially catastrophic consequences,
and with a likelihood of failure that is far too high.
Risks: insufficient national saving. Debt-financed
Social Security plans fare no better on the essential cri-
terion of increasing national saving.
An optimistic view of a plan to finance personal retire-
ment accounts with borrowing is that it would not
decrease national saving—because the increase in the
government deficit, a reduction in total saving, would
be offset by the deposits in the personal accounts.
Some might even claim that by introducing house-
holds to the rewards of compound interest and the
habit of saving through the deposits in those accounts,
there might even be a marginal increase in future
household, and thereby national, saving.
CED believes that such plans and claims aim far too
low. A major Social Security reform netting only a small
increase in national saving would be a tragically missed
opportunity. And in fact the claims of a small net posi-
tive for national saving could be much too optimistic. If
individuals are skeptical about their future returns from
the existing Social Security program, and if personal
retirement accounts give them confidence that they will
receive somewhat more, then all behavioral economics
would suggest that they would feel wealthier, and for
that reason would increase their consumption. National
saving would go down, not up.
Furthermore, financing personal retirement accounts
with borrowing would increase a public debt that is
already growing faster than the nation’s ability to repay it
(that is, faster than the GDP). It is unclear that the finan-
cial markets would quietly accept such a further
burgeoning debt on the account of the largest borrower
in the country (and the world), even if it would be
numerically offset by millions of small increases in hold-
ings of equities and bonds by individuals. With respect
to the risks to financial stability, it is the attractiveness of
the paper of that one largest borrower that is in ques-
tion.
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As noted above, the budget remains in largeand worsening deficit outside of SocialSecurity; and so whether or not Social
Security is addressed this year, policymakers must deal
seriously with the rest of the budget.
There is no question that, since the years of the large
budget surpluses in the late 1990s, the budget process
has broken down: the Congress has on two occasions
produced no budget resolution at all; necessary annual
appropriations bills routinely have been produced after
the beginning of the fiscal year; and in far too many
instances, appropriations have been enacted in massive
multi-agency omnibus bills, which are far too likely to
accommodate ill-considered spending, waste and
abuse. However, as one long-time budget watcher
once observed, “The process is not the problem; the
problem is the problem.” The best budget process—
noting that the same process that we had in the first
years of recurring and widening deficits in this decade
worked quite well in the 1990s—cannot yield respon-
sible decisions if there is no political will.
CED continues to recommend budget process reform,
and renewal of the recently expired procedures that in
the past worked reasonably well. But we recognize that
policymakers first must acknowledge and understand
the danger of current budget deficits, and then must
address the array of individual, complex program
issues in the budget. Without such a frank review, no
process will succeed.
CED’s very first principle of fiscal responsibility holds
that savings will be needed in every part of the budget.
That principle provides a cautionary note for every
policymaker. For those who would prefer to protect
the annual appropriations from playing a role in deficit
reduction, it is clear that the deficit is so large that no
spending category can be spared. CED notes this reality
while acknowledging our own longstanding support of
public investment that contributes to economic growth
and national well being—including education, notably at
the pre-school level; basic research; and physical infra-
structure. But CED recognizes that the federal budget is
now so tight that there is not a single dollar to waste;
and so savings must be achieved even in programs that
nominally pursue these essential goals, including “ear-
marks” that might be ineffective.
Still, the valid role for federally funded public invest-
ment carries a cautionary tale for the other side of the
budget debate. The nation cannot totally abandon
such essential contributors to future growth as the
funding for measurement-based education in the No
Child Left Behind Act, or domestic security through
adequate support of first responders. Such legitimate
needs will limit the savings that can be achieved from
the annual appropriations in the budget. And even
before any line-by-line analysis, the facts and figures
strongly indicate that annual appropriations cannot
possibly be the sole source of deficit reduction. For
example, in the fiscal year just ended (2004), domestic
appropriated outlays (including homeland security)
comprised less than 18 percent of the budget, accord-
ing to the Congressional Budget Office. The total of
such outlays was only $407 billion, or less than the
total budget deficit of $412 billion (and far less than
the non-Social Security deficit of $572 billion). Thus,
there simply is not enough blood in the domestic
appropriations rock to heal the budget. So it would be
most unwise to engage in other policies that would
worsen the deficit in vain anticipation that unspecified
savings from future appropriations would somehow
make up the shortfall.
Following are brief discussions of CED’s perspectives
on key issue areas in the annual appropriations of the
budget.
In sum, borrowing to establish personal retirement
accounts, especially with the budget already in serious
deficit, is at best too big a gamble. Success would
require that the financial markets accept planned, sub-
stantial and sustained federal budget deficits and
borrowing with an air more relaxed than in any
episode on record. On top of the existing budgetary
problems, and fiscal uncertainties ranging from life
expectancies through retirement choices; to advances
in health care technology and utilization; to productivity
growth, inflation, and energy prices; to war, terrorism,
and the aftermath of the 1990s stock market bubble
and revenue boom, the nation cannot afford an out-
look of decades of financial uncertainty of our own
creation. Markets cannot wait that long for confirmation
of the success of a Social Security reform; there would
always be the risk of a sudden adverse reaction and a
rush for the exits hanging over every business decision,
no matter how large or how small. Prudent stewardship
would reject such a course.
The Fiscal Agenda: The Budget Process and Appropriations
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National and Homeland Security Expenditures:
The commanding reality of this budget year is clearly
the engagement of our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.
It goes without saying that they must be equipped and
supported without reservation until circumstances
allow their safe return. In the meantime, there remain
issues regarding the underlying standing military
force, and the maintenance of homeland security.
The terrorist attacks of September 2001 have
inevitably raised both federal and state and local gov-
ernment expenditures on public health and safety, and
the expanded U.S. international role that has emerged
since then has produced a sharp increase in current
and planned military expenditures. As we argued
shortly after the attacks, while a significant realloca-
tion of public resources is undoubtedly necessary to
deal with these new responsibilities, “we must not let
these security concerns eclipse the need for sound
economic policies, both domestic and international. In
the long term, the health of our economy will largely
determine the well being of our society, including our
capacity to provide safety and security.”9
In the current environment, there is a temptation to
assume that budget constraints are no longer operative
where security is concerned and that we must “spend
whatever it takes.” However, with the understanding
of the special status of our troops in the field, quite
the opposite is true: Reconciling large, immediate
public needs with other public goals, and with private
consumption and investment demands, will require
more stringent budget discipline, not less. Policies
must distinguish carefully between what we genuinely
need for an adequate defense and the wish lists of the
military and its suppliers.
Early in 2001, the Administration discussed restruc-
turing the defense budget by eliminating or reducing
programs and activities that reflected outdated Cold
War defense requirements. It suggested, therefore,
skipping a generation of expensive weapons systems.10
However, there has been little evidence of such
restructuring in the defense budget since. The high
costs and inefficiencies of the ongoing operations and
maintenance activities of the military also give us con-
cern as business leaders. And these problems go well
beyond the expensive continuing operation of unnec-
essary military bases driven by Congressional politics.
We claim no special expertise on national security
needs, but given the fiscal outlook we believe that the
claims of respected defense analysts that we could
secure a greater capability from the standing force
(apart from the units in Iraq) for less than what was
recently projected for the end of the decade deserve
serious examination.11
The defense budget must be cost-effective and
focused sharply on the new national security situa-
tion. We urge the Administration and the Congress
rapidly to establish national defense priorities and
program reforms to accomplish this. The current
budget request should mark the beginning of a
careful review of defense needs.
With respect to homeland security, it is evident that
spending should and will rise substantially over time
as we develop greater capability to protect against and
respond to terrorist attacks. Here again, however, it is
essential that we prioritize, even though it is politi-
cally very difficult to do so. We cannot protect against
all eventualities. Some attacks are more likely than 
others, some are potentially far more damaging than
others, and we must allocate scarce resources to 
minimize risk. In making these choices, we should
also remember that the benefits of stronger homeland
security often involve higher costs to the economy as
well as to the budget.
Decision making for homeland security may be espe-
cially problematic, because it will be principally the
responsibility of the new Department of Homeland
Security, which is attempting to combine many previ-
ous federal departments and agencies, with very
different missions, into a single effective organization.
(The new Department will handle about two-thirds of
total homeland security spending.) It will be very dif-
ficult, at least initially, for such an organization to set
priorities that appropriately reflect the overall security
situation rather than the various missions of the for-
mer agencies. This will create strong pressures to
increase the budget to cover more contingencies. An
additional budgetary problem will arise because of the
difficulties in preventing duplication of functions and
personnel, in spite of the additional managerial flexi-
bility provided for the new Department.
For all these reasons, we believe that homeland
security expenditures will require special attention
and scrutiny in the next few years, and we urge
the Administration and Congress to provide this.
Finally, should another terrorist attack be made in the
United States, it is likely that, once again, those
responding to it will not be primarily federally trained
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experts or the armed services, but local police, fire,
and other personnel.12 These community forces are the
front line in our national battle against terror, and the
federal government must ensure that they have the
resources needed to do the job.
Non-Security Discretionary Spending: Given the
political difficulties in reducing expenditures on “per-
manently” funded entitlement programs in
comparison with programs funded with annual appro-
priations, it is not surprising that the latter have been
the favored targets for controlling federal expendi-
tures. The last quarter-century has seen an inexorable
“crowding out” of discretionary spending by entitle-
ment programs, which have expanded from about 51
percent of total non-interest federal expenditures in
the late 1970s to 61 percent in 2004, while discre-
tionary spending has fallen commensurately from
about 49 percent to 39 percent. Most of this decline,
however, has occurred in defense discretionary spend-
ing, which has experienced a decades-long slide
relative to the total budget and the size of the econ-
omy. Since the 1960s, defense spending has fallen
from about 8.5 to 3.5 percent of GDP (rising fraction-
ally with the current war effort). By comparison,
non-defense discretionary spending in relation to the
budget and the economy is roughly the same as it was
40 years ago. Defense spending obviously cannot con-
tinue to fall at this rate relative to GDP in the future,
so either the growth of non-defense discretionary
spending relative to GDP must fall, or that of total dis-
cretionary spending will rise.
Clearly there are many low-priority domestic discre-
tionary programs, and reductions in them have been
entirely appropriate. (Indeed, it is unfortunate that so
few have actually been eliminated.) We hold no brief
for protecting these programs in general, and espe-
cially the politically “earmarked” spending that
rewards narrow interests. We can and should bring
the rate of growth of non-security discretionary
spending below its historical level, and continue
the reduced rate of growth of the past two years.
As a result of the current intense budgetary pressures,
it will be difficult to sustain investment programs that
support economic growth. Two areas of investment—
public education and research and development—
cause us particular concern.
CED has long advocated both reforms and increased
investments in public education, especially in improv-
ing poorly performing schools in many low-income
communities, and in moving towards universal pre-
school.13 We must improve the achievement of
children attending low-performing schools both to
support economic growth and to promote equal
opportunity. We have argued that improvements in
learning will require more attention to, and accounta-
bility for, educational outcomes, and for that reason
have supported federal legislation and state initiatives
designed to do this. But we have also noted the seri-
ous difficulties likely to arise in implementing such
accountability measures.14
We are now at a critical juncture in these reform
efforts. The states have been given a task of raising the
achievement test scores of all students, which would
be enormously difficult in the best of circumstances.
In the circumstances they actually face, many states
and communities are ill-prepared to meet these goals,
and the continuing fiscal stringency facing most states
will severely limit the resources they can draw upon to
do so. We believe that education reform is too
important to be allowed to fail; the federal govern-
ment, which has mandated a national effort, is
obligated to assist the states in making it work. We
urge the Administration and Congress to provide
the funding needed to do so.
CED found in an earlier study that basic research in
science and engineering has made a major contribu-
tion to the growth of the U.S. economy. Economic
returns on investments in basic research are very high.
In addition, the returns to the nation from basic
research investments are substantially higher than the
returns to private firms, because advances in funda-
mental knowledge tend to be widely dispersed and
exploited in innovations that deliver substantial eco-
nomic benefits over a lengthy period.15
Publicly funded basic research is critical to private sec-
tor innovation. Although private industry conducts
basic research, these efforts are primarily to “fill-in-
the-gaps” within broader programs of applied research
aimed at new product development. Industry depends
on the intellectual foundations provided by basic
researchers in the nonprofit and public sectors for
innovative products and services; 73 percent of
research publications cited by industrial patents have
been found to be derived from government-funded
research.16 Because federal support is essential for a
thriving basic research enterprise, we urge the
Administration and Congress to make basic
research a high priority in the federal budget.
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As noted above, expenditures on discretionary non-
defense spending have grown at about the same rate as
the economy for many years. We are certainly no
admirers of formulaic budgeting, and support the reduc-
tion and elimination of low-priority programs whenever
possible. But budgetary history suggests there are sig-
nificant social and political limits to such reductions.
In light of the need to continue high-priority pro-
grams, and in particular public investments, we believe
it would be imprudent to assume that domestic discre-
tionary expenditures in the aggregate will grow
significantly more slowly than the economy in the future.
A Framework for Long-Term Budgetary Decision
Making: As noted above, the Congressional budget
process effectively self-destructed after fiscal year 1998.
In two years, no budget resolution was adopted; in
others, resolutions were honored more in the breach
than observance; and in many instances they were ren-
dered ineffective by unrealistic spending targets and
estimates. Perhaps more important, appropriation bills
have been repeatedly delayed and sometimes never
completed, giving rise to “omnibus” ad hoc spending
legislation that greatly impedes rational planning both
by public agencies and private recipients of govern-
ment funds. Such legislation also provides fertile
ground for narrow, self-interested spending projects. In
addition, policymakers are now beginning their fourth
annual cycle after the expiration of the legislated
budget control mechanisms limiting discretionary
spending, entitlement expansion, and tax cuts. Though
these mechanisms created by the 1990 Budget
Enforcement Act (BEA) were not perfect—no process
could be—they had bipartisan support and worked
reasonably well in the early and mid-1990s to struc-
ture and enforce budget decisions. Budget decisions
are now adrift, without fiscal goals to anchor them or
enforceable rules to discipline them.
CED believes it is urgent to implement a disci-
plined budget process that can address the
long-term fiscal issues that face us. First, Congress
must restore rationality to the appropriations
process. Second, we should implement annual joint
budget resolutions, agreed to by the Congress and
the President and enacted into law, that anticipate,
precede, and control all spending and tax legisla-
tion. Finally, to enforce the budget decisions of the
joint resolution, we should restore caps on discre-
tionary spending and the requirement that changes
in tax and entitlement programs be “deficit-neutral.”
We expressed our concern at the appearance of pro-
posals to apply the “pay-as-you-go” rule to entitlement
spending only, omitting controls on taxes, in the
course of the fiscal year 2005 budget cycle, and are
unhappy to note that this deficient proposal has been
repeated in this year’s budget.
In addition to an effective process for decision making,
rational budgeting today requires goals that are consis-
tent with long-term growth. Even though the budget has
fallen well out of immediate reach of what seemed rea-
sonable goals five years ago, policymakers must not
forget where they ultimately want to go. Thus, we rec-
ommend that the President and Congress should
establish a goal of balancing the budget (or producing
a surplus) excluding the “off-budget” Social Security
accounts over a rolling five-year horizon. The joint
budget resolution should make clear how the budget
policies of the resolution would promote this goal,
even though we cannot immediately move to a bal-
anced budget given the large current fiscal hole.
And in addition, the joint budget resolution should
also provide statistical measures of long-term fiscal
balance (such as the “fiscal gap” and unfunded gov-
ernment liabilities) and explain how the policies of
the resolution would affect those measures and
future levels of taxes or public debt. Such account-
ing could inhibit immediate budgetary deceptions such
as enacting tax cuts that are to be “temporary” for sev-
eral years but are assumed by all to be made
“permanent” later.
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In this year’s budget deliberations, the unacknowl-edged elephant sitting alone in the corner of theroom will be health care. There is a reason why
health care will be the missing player in the debate. And
that reason is a cautionary tale with respect to other
issues that do have a role in the decisions.
Demographic changes will have a huge impact on the
growth of Medicare and Medicaid expenditures—even
greater than that on Social Security (these three pro-
grams together constitute 42 percent of federal
spending). Medicare is expected to grow more rapidly
than Social Security and to run out of funds much
sooner. A rough indication of the potential burden is
provided by CBO’s projections indicating that between
the fiscal year just ended (2004) and 2050, outlays for
the OASDI system will grow by 1.9 percent of GDP,
from 4.3 percent to 6.2 percent, while Medicare will
grow by 5.7 percent of GDP, from 2.6 percent to 8.3
percent, and Medicaid by 1.8 percent of GDP, from 1.5
percent to 3.3 percent. These projections show that
these entitlement programs have put federal fiscal policy
on an explosive, unsustainable path. (See chart 3, which
shows that spending exclusive of Social Security,
Medicare and Medicaid is projected to decline as a per-
centage of GDP, but that outlays for those three
programs will grow rapidly—and as a result, net interest
costs will balloon.)
Although health care plays an unmistakable, command-
ing role in the projected long-term deterioration of the
budget, the health-care issue is in many ways far from
clear. For example, despite so much discussion of the
“burdens” involved in health-care expenditures, the 20th
century saw enormous improvements in the quality of
life, and in some cases longevity, for many elderly. It has
been estimated that improvements in the health status of
the population during the 20th century made as large a
contribution to economic welfare as all other consump-
tion increases combined.18 Health care is highly valued by
the American public, and it is entirely appropriate that we
devote an increasing proportion of national income and
output to it as the society grows more affluent and new
technology improves possibilities for treatment.
Despite this progress, it is clear that the U.S. health care
system is unsustainable, and that overuse, underuse,
and misuse of health care services produce both adverse
medical outcomes and unnecessary costs, as we argued
in A New Vision for Health Care: A Leadership Role for
Business (2002). The health-care industry, while making
dramatic technological advances in diagnosis and treat-
ment, is extremely inefficient in delivering care. Patients
have little stake in costs and insufficient awareness of
wide differences in provider quality.19 The U.S. now
spends twice as much on health care, per capita, as
other nations with equal or longer life expectancies. We
CED has for many years, and in many policy state-ments, taken the position that the federalgovernment should balance its budget, averaged
over years of economic strength and weakness.17 As
explained above, we strongly believe that deficits do mat-
ter to long term growth and prosperity. We do not believe
that we should deliberately run budget deficits as a means
to discipline spending. This has not worked in the past
and is a counsel of despair. Deliberately hamstringing
future Congressional decision making cannot be good
public policy; Congress should, and can, budget effectively
with the decision making framework described above.
We believe that additional reductions in federal 
revenues would be inconsistent with the goal of
long-term budgetary balance. The analysis above
shows that realistic projections of federal expenditures
and revenues, when combined with continued tax
reductions, produce deficits that remain far too high
during the coming decade and explode thereafter.
After reviewing the size of the long-term fiscal 
imbalance and the broad possibilities for spending
reductions in Social Security, Medicare, national
defense, homeland security, and other domestic pro-
grams, CED believes it extremely unlikely that the
long-term budget problem can be solved without
additional revenues. We therefore urge the
Administration and Congress to forgo at this time
any additional tax reductions (including the perma-
nent extension of the Economic Growth and Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001) that would further
reduce long-term revenues. Moreover, we should use
this opportunity to begin to explore alternative or
additional long-term sources of revenue and taxation
systems that support long-term growth objectives.
The Fiscal Agenda: Health Care
The Fiscal Agenda: Taxation
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do not claim to know the “right” proportion of the national
income that should be spent on health care in the future,
but we firmly believe the resources we do provide should
lead to higher quality and more cost-efficient care.
A major source of unnecessarily high costs of health
care is the lack of incentives to seek higher quality and
lower costs on the part of both providers and pur-
chasers of care. We have recommended improving
those incentives for businesses, but public purchasers
such as Medicare (the largest purchaser of health care)
and some state governments also are ineffective pur-
chasers of care. Fee-for-service Medicare is required by
law to be a passive payer of providers’ bills and has no
authority to reward providers of high quality and
effectively managed care. While the Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has begun to
make information on quality of care available to
Medicare enrollees, the program lacks financial incen-
tives to select the best performing providers.
It is clear that significant health-care savings relative to
current projections must be achieved relative to the
current baseline if the budget deficit is to be con-
tained. As a part of that effort, we reiterate our earlier
recommendation that Medicare be restructured
along the lines of the Federal Employee Health
Benefit Program (FEHBP). FEHBP, a highly success-
ful plan covering nine million federal workers and
their dependents, has adopted a defined contribution
model that creates incentives for workers to select
cost-effective health plans with affordable employee
contributions. Many states have developed for their
public employees, and in some cases for Medicaid
enrollees, health care programs similar to FEHBP, with
contribution structures that encourage choices based
on appraisals of quality and cost. CED also urges
states that have not adopted such programs to do
so as a means of improving both the quality of
health care and the efficiency of its delivery. At the
same time, CED recommends strengthening initiatives
to reduce fraud and abuse in Medicare and Medicaid,
and capping the currently open-ended federal tax
exclusion of employer contributions to promote cost
discipline and equity, which could also provide some
funding for policies to expand access.
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We caution, however, that even with reforms in Medicare
that improve its efficiency, policymakers are unlikely to
find long-term savings that greatly reduce the long-term
costs currently projected—and this is perhaps the pri-
mary reason why health care will not find a place at this
year’s budget negotiating table. As noted above, the
health-care system must acknowledge among its ineffi-
ciencies underuse and lack of coverage, as well as
overuse. The prospect of significant savings based on the
fact that a high percentage of medical expenses arise in
the last year of life does not appear to be practical.
Evidence on the roles of tort costs and defensive medi-
cine is mixed. Even reforms aimed specifically at
achieving efficiency are difficult to assess. Indeed, both
the Administration and the CBO have estimated that the
market reform provisions of the Medicare prescription
drug legislation will in fact add to costs over the foresee-
able future.
In short, knowledge of potential health-care savings 
policies is limited. Health care may be the most techno-
logically dynamic sector in the economy, leaving
enormous uncertainty about costs even five years from
now, much less 50 or 75. We simply cannot yet identify
cost-related policies that could promise specific savings
over a long-term actuarial horizon. Accordingly, until
such knowledge is developed, we can expect budget
policies relating to health care to be incremental, and less
than definitive or satisfying. And it would probably be
unwise to postpone addressing the long-run shortfall in
Social Security, even though the projected health-care
shortfalls are even larger, because the state of knowledge
in health care is not sufficiently far advanced at this time.
And hence the cautionary tale: We must assume going
forward that the pressures on non-health budget issues
will be even more intense, given the difficulty of achiev-
ing savings in health care. And given the state of
knowledge at this time, we cannot assume that some sil-
ver-bullet policy will save us through massive cost
reductions in projected health-care outlays. Once more,
the lesson of a sober assessment of the disturbing
budget situation is prudent action; we must begin now,
but we must do no harm.
Conclusion
In sum, America does stand at a fiscal crossroad. Andif there has been any change since CED’s last state-ment on this issue, it is that the nation’s current
standing is even more perilous. The federal government’s
fiscal position looking out over the next decade has dete-
riorated still further, and we are even closer to the onset
of powerful demographic changes that will make the
budget situation even more difficult to control. CED and
other observers have long said that the real deficit prob-
lem lies in the long run; and now, with the structural nature
of the deficit and the beginning of the retirement of the
baby boom just three years away, the long run is upon us.
We must begin now, working across the broadest front,
to turn the budget around, so that our nation does not
enter the retirement of the baby boom with a public
debt already growing faster than its ability to repay it.
And viewing the budget agenda for this year, our most
urgent message is that we must not risk making the
deficit even worse through irreversible policies with
questionable and far-distant benefits. This is a time for
prompt and prudent action.
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OBJECTIVES OF THE COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
For over 60 years, the Committee for Economic 
Development has been a respected influence on the 
formation of business and public policy. CED is 
devoted to these two objectives:  
To develop, through objective research and 
informed discussion, findings and recommendations 
for private and public policy that will contribute to 
preserving and strengthening our free society, 
achieving steady economic growth at high 
employment and reasonably stable prices, 
increasing productivity and living standards, 
providing greater and more equal opportunity for 
every citizen, and improving the quality of life for 
all. 
To bring about increasing understanding by 
present and future leaders in business, government, 
and education, and among concerned citizens, of 
the importance of these objectives and the ways in 
which they can be achieved. 
CED’s work is supported by private voluntary 
contributions from business and industry, 
foundations, and individuals. It is independent, 
nonprofit, nonpartisan, and nonpolitical.   
Through this business-academic partnership, 
CED endeavors to develop policy statements and 
other research materials that commend themselves 
as guides to public and business policy; that can be 
used as texts in college economics and political 
science courses and in management training 
courses; that will be considered and discussed by 
newspaper and magazine editors, columnists, and 
commentators; and that are distributed abroad to 
promote better understanding of the American 
economic system.   
CED believes that by enabling business leaders 
to demonstrate constructively their concern for the 
general welfare, it is helping business to earn and 
maintain the national and community respect 
essential to the successful functioning of the free 
enterprise capitalist system
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